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TRANSNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL JUDGMENTS
George A. Zaphiriou*
I. Introduction
It is characteristic of interdependence and a necessity for the attainment of
international order that the judiciaries of the various countries should cooperate'
and the civil judgments should be readily recognized and enforced with mini-
mum formalities. Moreover, it is fair and just that the adjudicated right of the
successful plaintiff, his successors, assigns, and privies should be respected trans-
nationally and that conversely the successful defendant, his successors, assigns,
and privies should not be subjected to unnecessary harassment. Respect of res
judicata, however, should not work to the detriment of standards of justice. It
is therefore necessary that the court which is asked to recognize or enforce a
foreign judgment (to be referred to as the "court addressed") should be satisfied
that the court of origin had transnational jurisdiction according to accepted
principles, that the defendant had both adequate notice of the original pro-
ceedings and an opportunity to defend, and that recognition or enforcement is
not manifestly repugnant to fundamental notions of public policy. Generally
the tendency is to accept foreign judgments on their face value when it appears
that jurisdiction, proper and adequate notice to the defendant, and public policy
are satisfied. Other defenses are also available, but they are left to be raised
and proved by the party objecting to recognition or enforcement, rather than by
the party that seeks it. A correct distribution between matters to be considered
by the court addressed of its own motion and the matters that are to be proved by
the objecting party leads to the desired balance between the expeditious respect
and enforcement of adjudicated rights and the attainment of justice.
"Recognition" means simply that a foreign final and conclusive judgment
will be recognized as such. If it is a judgment in rem affecting interests in im-
movable or movable property or personal status, recognition will confirm its con-
clusiveness against the world at large. A wide effect will also be given to a
binding declaratory judgment. If it is an in personam judgment, recognition will
attribute to it a res judicata effect as to the main issue and a collateral estoppel
effect as to decided issues which are binding on the original parties and those
claiming under them.
Recognition is a condition precedent to enforcement. Enforcement entails
the affirmative relief consisting in the recovery of money or property or the
ordering of the defendant or counterdefendant to do an act or enjoining the
doing of an act. We shall see that statutory provisions in the United Kingdom
* Illinois attorney; Barrister of the Middle Temple, London; advocate before the Supreme
Court of Greece. Panelist on panel of arbitrators of the American Arbitration Association;
member of the ABA sub-committee reviewing the United Kingdom-United States Draft Con-
vention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters; Vice-
Chairman of the International and Foreign Law Committee on the Chicago Bar Association.
1 See Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters of
March 18, 1970, 8 IN'rL LEG. MAT. 37 (1969); Rio Tinto Zing Corporation v. Westinghouse
Electric Corporation, 16 INT'L LEG. MAT. 784 (1977).
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and the United States on recognition or enforcement of foreign country judg-
ments limit their scope to money judgments leaving the pursuit of other relief to
judicial precedent and discretion.
The purpose of this analysis is to deal with the recognition and enforcement
of foreign country judgments in the United States, the United Kingdom and
the European Community, with particular reference to areas within the scope of
three conventions. The three conventions are:
(1) The Hague Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of April 26, 19662 (to
be referred to as the "Hague Convention") with a Supplementary Protocol of
October 15, 1966.'
The United States delegation participated in the preparation of the Hague
Convention and signed it at an extraordinary session of the Hague conference
of private international law. So did delegations of several other countries which
included all present members of the European Community.4 The Hague Con-
vention is not effective, but it reflects unanimous expert opinion and constitutes
evidence of international consensus among countries representing vast com-
mercial interests. Excluded from its scope are judgments determining as a main
issue the status or capacity of persons, all family matters both personal and
proprietary, maintenance, alimony, the constitution of legal persons or the
powers of their officers, questions of succession, bankruptcy, questions relating to
social security and questions relating to damage or injury in nuclear matters.5
The Convention, by providing that it does not apply to judgments for the pay-
ment of any customs duty, tax or penalty,' reflects the view that foreign country
judgments on revenue and penal matters are not enforceable.7 It also does not
apply to judgments that order provisional or protective measures or that are
rendered by administrative tribunals.' The Hague Convention is multilateral,
but it is subject to bilateralization. Article 21 provides that for the Convention
to become effective between two countries which are parties to the Convention,
they must enter into a supplementary agreement. Article 23 further provides
that the supplementary agreement may clarify certain of the Convention's terms,
include judgments that are otherwise excluded from its scope, and amend the
list of appropriate jurisdictional bases that are stated in the Convention.
(2) The Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (to be referred to as
the "European Convention") with annexed Protocol and Joint Declaration.'
2 5 INT'L LEG. MAT. 636 (1966); 15 Amf. J. ComP. L. 362 (1967).
3 15 AM. J. ComP. L. 369 (1967).
4 Also Austria, Finland, Greece, Israel, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey and the United Arab Republic.
5 Hague Convention, Art. 1(2).
6 Id. at Art. 1(3).
7 Government of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491 (H.L.); United States v. Harden,
[1963] Can. Sup. Ct. 366; 41 D.L.R.2d 721. The Uniform Money Judgments Recognition
Act, 13 U. L. ANN. 269 (1977 Supp.), which has been adopted by nine states of the United
States excludes in § 1(2) "a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty ..
8 Hague Convention, Art. 2(2).
9 Official Journal of the European Communities L 299/32 (1972). The references in this
article are to an unpublished English Language Text Agreed in Negotiations at Official Level
(Nov. 1976). See also 2 CoMM. MxT. REP. (CCH) .f 6003 (updated).
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The European Convention and the annexed documents were ratified by the
six original member states and became effective as of February 1, 1973. The
new member states (Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom), pursuant to
Article 220 of the EEC Treaty" and Article 3 (2) of the Act of Accession," will
accede to the European Convention subject to minor adjustments which have
now been prepared, but are not yet widely publicized. The European Convention
excludes the same matters that were excluded by the Hague Convention with the
exception of maintenance 1 2 (which includes alimony) and the determination of
the existence or constitution of companies and legal persons and the powers of
their officers and directors. It is understandable that these matters should be
included in a Convention which is intended to apply to a community of states
striving to attain a quasi-federal structure. One of the objects of the European
Community is to facilitate the mutual recognition of companies and legal per-
sons '3 and to harmonize certain company law provisions. 4 It is therefore
desirable that judgments dealing with these matters should be recognized and
enforced within the European Community. Judgments on revenue, customs,
and administrative matters are not expressly excluded. Nevertheless, the inten-
tion was to exclude them by providing in Article 1(1) that the Convention
"shall apply in civil and commercial matters." The exclusion will be even more
explicit in the document of accession to the European Convention to be signed
by the new member states. This will state in unequivocal terms that the European
Convention does "not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs, or administra-
tive matters." The European Convention is not limited to money judgments.
It also includes provisional judgments provided they are enforceable in the
country of origin.
(3) The Draft Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil Matters between the United Kingdom and the United
States which was initialled by the negotiators of the two countries on October 26,
1976"s (to be referred to as the "U.K.-U.S.A. Convention").
If ratified, the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention will be the first convention on
recognition and enforcement of judgments to which the United States will be a
party. The scope of this Convention is very similar to the Hague Convention.
The U.K.-U.S.A. Convention excludes in Article 2(2) (b) judgments "to the
extent that they are for punitive or multiple damages." This would exclude, for
example, treble damages in civil antitrust cases. The Hague Convention has
no comparable provision. The exclusion in Article 1(3) of the Hague Con-
vention of "decisions for the payment of any customs duty, tax or penalty"
refers to criminal or administrative penalties. The U.K.-U.S.A. Convention is
not limited to money judgments, other relief may be granted by the court ad-
dressed in accordance with its law.'" According to Article 3 of the U.K.-U.S.A.
10 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) (updated).
11 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) % 7035 (updated).
12 See Arts. 1 and 5(2) of the European Convention.
13 See Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons of 29 Feb.
1968, Bulletin of the European Communities Supp. 2/69; 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 6255.
14 C. SCHIIITTHOFF (ed.), THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS (1973);
E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS (1971).
15 16 INT'L LEG. MAT. 71 (1977).
16 U.K.-U.S.A. Convention, Art. 15(1).
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Convention, its provisions do not prevent the recognition or enforcement of a
judgment under an existing statute or at common law.
II. Recognition and Enforcement in the United States
The weight of authority and of legal opinion supports the view that recogni-
tion and enforcement of a foreign country judgment are matters to be determined
by state law." As a consequence, state courts are not bound by the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot"8 in which a majority of 5 to
4 held that a French judgment was not to be enforced in the United States
because of lack of reciprocity by France. Furthermore, after the 1938 decision
in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 9 a federal court may be asked in a non-federal matter
to apply the law of the state in which it sits. The majority of decisions of state
courts,2" with isolated exceptions, 2' have rejected the reciprocity requirement
and federal courts22 have questioned its application. The Uniform Money
Judgments Recognition Act,2" which deals with foreign country judgments,
requires no reciprocity. It was adopted by nine states,24 out of which only
Massachusetts has provided by statut6 that reciprocity is required. 5 These
developments prompted a commentator to remark that it is "regrettable that
the Restatement (Second) did not more clearly consign the reciprocity rule to
oblivion."20
Although a distinction is drawn between sister state judgments which are
to be recognized under the compulsion of the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution and foreign country judgments, the tendency is to
treat them on an equal footing. The United States Supreme Court in Hilton v.
Guyot 7 formulated two significant principles that had found early support in
England. 8 First, the principle that a foreign country judgment which is com-
patible with the requirement of due process should be recognized and enforced
17 Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Republic of Iraq v. First National Bank, 350 F.2d 645
(7th Cir. 1965); Domingo v. States Marine Lines, 340 F. Supp. 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966); Compania Mexicana
Radiodifusora Franteriza v. Spann, 41 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Tex. 1941), afl'd, 131 F.2d 609
(5th Cir. 1942); cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 233 U.S. 185 (1912); Johnston v. Com-
pagnie Generale Transatlantique 242 N.Y. 381 (1926); Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper
Co. 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y.S. 284, aff'd, 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669 (1927); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, Comment 3 (1971); VON MEHREN & PATTER-
SON, ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN COUNTRY JUDGMENTS 104 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE 17
(1974). But see Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 18 Am. J.
Co zp. LAw 367 (1970).
18 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
19 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20 See note 17 supra.
21 Hager v. Hager, 1 Ill. App.3d 1047, 274 N.E.2d 157 (1971).
22 See note 17 supra.
23 13 U. L. ANN. 269 (1977 Supp.).
24 Alaska, California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Oklahoma
and Washington.
25 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 235, § 23A (Supp. 1977).
26 Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
72 COLO. L. REv. 250, 236 (1972).
27 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
28 See notes 114, 158 infra.
[Vol. 53:734]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
even if it was based on an error as to a question of fact or law.' Secondly, that
recognition and enforcement are founded on comity which in addition to
"courtesy and goodwill" contains an element of public international law obliga-
tion."0 Comity has generally been criticized as a vague concept leading to the
requirement of reciprocity; also that the reference to a public international law
obligation disregards the nature and function of conflict rules as part of internal
law and provides no explanation for the defenses that can be raised against recog-
nition.31
A point can perhaps now be made as to the increasing internationalization
of conflict rules in this as well as in other topics. The Hague Convention, the
European Convention, and the many bilateral conventions on recognition and
enforcement of judgments that exist between countries in Europe32 and between
the United Kingdom and countries of the Commonwealth,33 provide evidence
of consensus extending over a significant geographical area and representing vast
commercial interests. The U.K.-U.S.A. Convention, if ratified, and other con-
ventions that may follow between the United States and other member states of
the European Community will be important additions. Even when there is no
relevant binding convention, the legislatures and courts in this country as well
as abroad tend to adopt, in connection with the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, standardized requirements and defenses. The conflict rules,
though part of internal law, are in their transnational application either directly
affected by binding conventions or indirectly fashioned according to generally
accepted standards. They deserve now, more than ever, the name of private
international law. Comity and reciprocity have lost their negative and limiting
effect and have become in a world of interdependence positive factors of unifica-
tion.
A foreign country judgment, out of contested proceedings or in default of
appearance, if final and conclusive in the country of origin, will be recognized
and enforced in the United States if it satisfies the following prerequisites: (1)
fair trial, (2) transnational jurisdiction of the court of origin, (3) proper notice
to the defendant and (4) adequate opportunity to defend. It will not be
recognized and enforced if: (1) it was obtained by fraud, (2) it is contrary to
public policy or (3) it is irreconcilable with another judgment on the same
transaction or occurrence.
A. Fair Trial
A foreign country judgment will not be recognized in the United States
unless a federal or state court is convinced that:
29 See note 27, supra at 203.
30 Id. at 163-64.
31 Peterson, supra note 26, at 239; Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments
Rendered Abroad, 50 COLO. L. REv. 783, 785 (1950); Smit, International Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 44, 56 (1962).
32 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCE-
MENT OF FOREIGN JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN CIVIL AND COEMMERCIAL LAWv (1975).
33 See Part III, Section A of text infra.
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IThere has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court
of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings,
after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a
system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice
between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and
there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court or in the system of
laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring judgment .... 34
The requirement of fair trial is merely an application of the requirements of
due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution to the recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments
even though they would not apply directly to foreign proceedings. 5 It was
included in § 4(1) of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act
and has acquired statutory sanction in the nine states 6 that have adopted the
Act. In contrast it is not mentioned in § 93 of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws, which deals with the recognition of sister state judgments, as it is
understood that both the original proceedings and the recognition and enforce-
ment proceedings are subject to due process and that means of recourse are
available to ensure compliance. The requirement of fair trial is also not men-
tioned in the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention. It was presumably felt that this re-
quirement is adequately covered and protected by providing in the Convention
jurisdictional grounds satisfying minimum contact standards, the requirement
of due notice to the defendant, and the opportunity to make arrangements for his
defense. In any event, the reservation of public policy contained in the Con-
vention can be used in extreme cases to exclude the recognition or enforcement
of a judgment which was obtained in proceedings that. offended against due
process. The express mention of the due process requirement in the U.K.-U.S.A.
Convention would amount to an invitation to the judgment-debtor to raise fair
trial points to delay the enforcement.
B. Jurisdiction
The foreign country judgment will only be recognized and enforced if the
court of origin exercised jurisdiction according to standards acceptable to the
federal or state court addressed. These standards are set by taking into account
the adjudicatory jurisdiction of an American court in a comparable situation.
After all it is unfair to deny to a foreign court a jurisdictional basis exercised
by American courts in transnational situations. Internationally prevailing
standards, however, should also be taken into account. This can be illustrated
by referring to the exercise by the court of origin of a jurisdiction analogous to
the quasi in rem jurisdiction of American courts. If a Scottish court37 or a court
of the Federal Republic of Germany"8 exercised jurisdiction based on the presence
or attachment of an asset of the defendant within the jurisdiction, an American
34 Hiltonv. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895).
35 Reese, supra note 31, at 796; Smit, supra note 31, at 46.
36 See note 24 supra.
37 DUNCAN & DYKES, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL JURISDICTION 71-103 (1911).
38 GERMAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Art. 23.
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court could object, particularly if the asset on which jurisdiction was founded was
unrelated to the cause of action, or was insubstantial and entitled the plaintiff to
damages exceeding its value. The jurisdiction quasi in ren was not included in
either the Hague Convention, the European Convention or the U.K.-U.S.A.
Convention. Generally accepted standards do n9t favor a jurisdiction founded on
the mere presence or attachment of an asset unless it is to assert a proprietary
interest in that particular asset or to deal with a security interest therein. 9
The Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act4 (to be referred
to as the "Uniform Recognition Act") provides that a foreign judgment is not
conclusive if the court of origin did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant or jurisdiction over the subject matter. A mandatory provision is
contained in § 5 (a) of the Uniform Recognition Act to the effect that a foreign
country judgment shall not be refused recognition for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion in either of six situations: (1) personal service of the defendant in the
foreign country; (2) voluntary appearance of the defendant other than for the
sole purpose of protecting property seized or threatened to be seized or to contest
the jurisdiction of the court; (3) submission by the defendant to jurisdiction
before commencement of proceedings; (4) the defendant was domiciled in the
foreign country or if the defendant is a body corporate it had a principal place of
business in the foreign country or was incorporated there; (5) the defendant
had a business office in the foreign country and the subject matter of the action
arose out of business done by the defendant through that office; or (6) the
defendant operated a car or airplane in the foreign country and the subject
matter of the action arose out of that operation. A foreign country judgment
need not be recognized, however, if the parties had agreed to settle their dispute
otherwise than by proceedings in the court of origin,4 e.g. by an arbitration
clause or a choice of forum clause. Nor need it be recognized in case of juris-
diction based only on personal service if the court of origin was a "seriously in-
convenient forum for the trial of the action."42 This last provision would enable
an American court to refuse recognition if a foreign country judgment was
rendered against a transient defendant who was served when he was present
within the territorial judisdiction of the court of origin.
Section 5 (b) of the Uniform Recognition Act permits the recognition of ad-
ditional bases of jurisdiction. In fact both federal and state courts have recog-
nized judgments rendered by a court of origin exercising jurisdiction on grounds
that were not mentioned above. A New York court43 dealing with an English
default judgment upheld the jurisdiction of the English court on the ground
that the defendant had sold and shipped goods to England. The judge observed
39 Supplementary Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 3, at Arts. 1 and 4. See
Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977), where it was held that an American court can only
exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the individual or
corporate defendant and the state to satisfy the due process requirement of the U.S. Constitution.
40 See note 23 supra.
41 Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, § 4(b) (5).
42 Id. at § 4(b)(6).
43 Plugmay Ltd., v. National Dynamics Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 913, 266 N.Y.S. 2d 240 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y.C. 1966), rev'd for trial on the jurisdictional issue, 53 Misc. 2d 451, 278 N.Y.S.2d
896 (App. term 1st Dept. 1967).
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that the jurisdiction exercised by the English court was equivalent to the
jurisdiction which is exercised by courts in New York or Illinois under statutes
that require merely a "single act" of the defendant within the jurisdiction.
Another New York court" upheld the jurisdiction of an English court in an
action for breach of contract on the ground that the contract was made in
England. The above decisions of the New York courts are somewhat impaired
because on appeal the summary judgments were set aside and a trial on the
jurisdictional issue was ordered. They are, however, indicative of an approach
which is clearly demonstrated by a decision of the Court of Appeals of
the Third Circuit which held that doing business by the defendant through a
distributor in England, constituted a sufficient basis of jurisdiction for the en-
forcement of an English default judgment against the defendant in Pennsyl-
vania.
45
The Uniform Recognition Act recognizes the jurisdiction which was ex-
ercised by a court of origin in case of a tort arising out of the operation of a car
or airplane in the country of origin. 6 This jurisdictional basis is more limited
than the jurisdiction which is exercised by American courts under various long
arm statutes.47 These American statutes provide that jurisdiction can be ex-
ercised in the case of commission of a tort within the state and that the defendant
can be served outside the jurisdiction. A similar provision is contained in
Order 11 rule 1(1) (h) of the Rules of the Supreme Court which enables an
English court to exerCse jurisdiction when the tort was committed in England.
These wider jurisdictions are up to a point reflected in the U.K.-U.S.A. Con-
vention.4' The U.K.-U.S.A. Convention recognizes the jurisdiction of the court
of origin in actions for the recovery of damages for physical injuries to the
person or for damage to tangible property when a substantial portion of the
conduct, as well as the effect of that conduct, occurred within the territory of the
country of origin (i.e. the United Kingdom or the United States, as the case
may be) and either conduct or effect occurred within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court of origin (i.e. of a court in England and Wales, Northern Ireland or
Scotland or of a district court or circuit court in the United States)." The pro-
vision has four important limitations: First, it refers to actions for the. recovery
of damages; this would exclude injunctions. Secondly, it refers to physical
injuries; this would exclude defamation and antitrust violations. Thirdly, damage
to tangible property leaves out such important intangibles as patents, copyright
and trademarks. Fourthly, to found jurisdiction both conduct and effect must
coincide within the country of origin. Of course, the jurisdiction of the court of
origin over any of the excluded matters may be upheld on some other ground,
e.g. place of residence or place of business of the defendant within the territory
of origin. The coincidence of tortious conduct and effect within the country of
origin is also a requirement of Article 10(4) of the Hague Convention.
44 H. L. Wilkinson & Co. v. Calvine Mills, Inc., 28 App. Div. 2d 675, 282 N.Y.S.2d 655
(1967) (appeal against summary judgment ordering a trial on the jurisdictional issue).
45 Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., supra note 17.
46 Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, § 5(a) (6).
47 See, e.g., Illinois Civil Practice Act, § 17(1) (b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1) (b).
48 U.K.-U.S.A. Convention, Art. 10 (j).
49 Id. at Art. 2 (2)(b).
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An important and difficult question is whether the finding as to jurisdiction
of the court of origin amounts to res judicata and is therefore not open to review
by the court addressed. In case of sister state judgments, the findings as to
jurisdiction by the court of origin will generally be respected in another state,
because of the wide application of the full faith and credit clause, unless there has
been a violation of due process or some other constitutional limitation." In
the case of foreign country judgments, according to the weight of authority, the
courts in the United States are not bound by the jurisdictional findings of the
court of origin." Nevertheless, in a 1971 case,52 the Court of Appeals of the
Third Circuit went a long way to enforce a default judgment rendered by an
English court. The United States court recognized the adjudication as to juris-
diction of the English court which was based on a long arm English provision
analogous to the long arm statutes of states of the United States and refused to
order proof of certain facts which were relevant to the jurisdictional finding.
Authority appears to be divided as to whether a foreign country judgment is
presumed to have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction until the matter
is raised by a party opposed to recognition or whether the matter should be
examined of the court's own motion. 3 It is submitted that since recognition and
enforcement of a judgment rendered by a foreign court without jurisdiction may
indirectly constitute a violation of due process, the American court should of its
own motion examine the matter. In most cases, the issue of whether jurisdiction
was properly exercised will appear on the face of the judgment, but if there is
any doubt, the parties should be invited to make their submissions.54
A distinction should be made, however, between conclusions as to jurisdic-
tion and findings of fact as to jurisdiction by the court of origin. Article 12 of
the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention provides that conclusions as to jurisdiction are not
binding on the court addressed. On the other hand findings of fact are binding,
unless the person opposing recognition or enforcement can establish that they
are incorrect; he is precluded from doing so if the defendant appeared in the
court of origin and failed to challenge its jurisdiction.55
C. Notice to Defendant
Not only must the court in the United States be satisfied that the foreign
court had jurisdiction, but it must also be satisfied that the defendant in the
original proceedings was duly served with process. The Uniform Recognition
Act provides in § 4 (b) that a foreign judgment "need not be recognized" if the
defendant in the original proceedings did not receive notice of the proceedings
in sufficient time to enable him to defend. Although the ground for non-recogni-
50 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAW, supra note 17, at §§ 96, 97, 103.
51 See VON ME-REN & PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 33 and authorities cited therein.
52 Somportex Ltd. u. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., supra note 17.
53 VON MEHREN & PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 33, 34 and authorities cited therein.
54 The U.K.-U.S.A. Convention provides in Article 15 that the court addressed may
require a statement as to the grounds relied upon to establish the jurisdiction of the court of
origin.
55 Article 9 of the Hague Convention provides that findings of facts by the court of origin
are binding on the court addressed unless the judgment was rendered by default.
[April 1978]
TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL JUDGMENTS
tion appears to be discretionary, the court is bound not to recognize a judgment
rendered in default of appearance of a defendant who had either no actual
notices or no proper notice.17 Under these circumstances, lack of actual or
proper notice goes to the fairness of the trial and would render the judgment
inconclusive. In transnational cases reference is made to the standards set by the
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments in Civil or Commercial Matters of November 15, 1965.5" In several
European countries, substituted service was effected on persons absent and
without a place of residence within the jurisdiction by simply serving the docu-
ments on a local official. As a result of the Hague Convention on Service Abroad,
however, the situation has improved. 9 Even countries that did not sign the
Convention have complied with the standards that it has set and in addition to
substituted service they impose service abroad through diplomatic channels.6"
Article 20(3) of the European Convention has incorporated by reference Article
15 of the Hague Convention on Service Abroad which contains a number of
safeguards ensuring that proper methods were used to serve the documents
effectively on the defendant and that adequate time was granted to provide the
defendant with an opportunity to appear.
D. Fraud
A foreign country judgment will not be recognized or enforced when it was
obtained by fraud. 1 By analogy to what applies to domestic judgments, the
fraud must be extrinsic and not intrinsic.62 The determination of what amounts
to extrinsic and what to intrinsic fraud presents difficulties and the distinction
between the two is often blurred." Intrinsic fraud is one which "occurred dur-
ing the course of the trial upon a subject on which both parties presented
evidence."64 Usual examples of intrinsic fraud are perjury, adducing forged
evidence, or fraudulent misrepresentation on the court. Extrinsic fraud exists
when "the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case."65
The rationale for the application of the distinction to both domestic and foreign
56 Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 21. So.2d 141 (1945); In re Paramythiotis' Estate, 15
Misc.2d 133, 181 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172
S.W. 711 (1915).
57 Hager v. Hager, supra note 21; Julen v. Larsen, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal. Rep.
796 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
58 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163. The Convention was ratified
by the United States and is effective. In Julen v. Larsen, supra note 57, reference was made
to the standards set by the Convention.
59 Changes were introduced in France in 1965. See Norman, La delivrance des actes a
l'etranger et les delais de distance, 55 REv. CRIT. DE DROIT INT. PRIVa 386 (1966).
60 See, e.g., Greece which introduced changes in 1967 and embodied them in a new Code
of Civil Procedure of 1968/1971.
61 Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act § 5(b) (2) U.K.-U.S.A. Conven-
tion, Art. 7(b). Both provisions do not distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud.
62 Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 34, at 207-10 (where the question was reviewed but left
open); MacKay v. McAlexander, 268 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1959); Tamimi v. Tamimi 38 App.
Div. 2d 197, 328 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1972).
63 F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.7 (1965).
64 Note, Equitable Relief Against an Award Obtained by Perjury; The Extrinsic-Intrinsic
Fraud Distinction, 36 ILL. L. REV. 894, 895 (1941-42).
65 United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878).
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judgments is that the conclusiveness of the judgment would be- seriously im-
paired if alleged fraud as to matters already litigated were to be permitted and
that as a result there would be no end to litigation.
E. Public Policy
The Uniform Recognition Act"6 provides that a foreign judgment "need
not be recognized" if the original claim on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of the state. It refers only to the original clair
and not to the foreign proceedings because these are covered by the requirement
of a fair trial in § 4(1) of the Uniform Recognition Act. Lack of fair trial
renders the foreign judgment nonconclusive whereas repugnancy of the original
claim to public policy entitles the court addressed not to recognize the judgment.
The former is mandatory and the latter discretionary. The same distinction is
followed by the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws."
The U.K.-U.S.A. Convention adopted a different approach. It has omitted
the express requirement of a fair trial and has applied instead the reservation of
public policy to the original claim and the foreign proceedings."8 It is submitted
that even under such a comprehensive application of the public policy reserva-
tion, an American court will distinguish between matters offending against due
process in which case it must refuse recognition and other matters affecting the
original claim or rules of procedure in which case it will only refuse recognition
if they are fundamental in a transnational context. The fact that an action on
the original claim could not have been maintained in an American court does
not necessarily mean that a foreign judgment based on the claim should be
refused recognition in the United States.69 Nor does the admission by the court
of origin of hearsay evidence or of unsworn evidence or the lack of an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine entitle an American court to refuse recognition."
E. No Review of Merits or of Choice of Law
An American court will not review a foreign judgment as to its merits,7
nor will it refuse recognition or enforcement on the ground that if it had con-
sidered the matter in the first instance it would have come to a different decision
by applying a different rule of conflict of laws." Thus a New York court, in a
1970 case, 3 enforced, as to assets deposited in a New York bank, a French
judgment applying the French forced heirship law to the estate of a Frenchman
who had died domiciled in New York. If the New York court had determined
the matter originally it would have applied the law of New York as the law of
the domicile of the deceased and would have denied the forced share.
66 See note 63, supra at § 4(b)(3).
67 Id. at § 117 Comment c.
68 Id. at U.K.-U.S.A. Convention, Art. 7(a). See Reese, supra note 31, at 796, who
suggests that the standards of due process are included in the requirement of natural justice.
69 Neporany v. Kir, 5 App. Div.2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1st Dep't 1958).
70 Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 34, at 204-05.
71 Id. at 203.
72 VON MEHREN & PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 40.
73 Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.S.2d 270, 279; 265 N.E.2d 739, 744 (1970).
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In contrast to the American and as we shall see the English approach,
French courts review the choice of law by the court of origin to see whether it
agrees with their own and if it does not and the decision reached by the court of
origin is not the same as the one that they would have reached, they refuse
recognition or enforcement.7 4 German law"5 imposes the same test but only as to
certain matters pertaining to personal status and affecting a German national.
The U.K.-U.S.A. Convention confirms in Article 9 the rule that there will
be no review of merits or of choice of law, but provides for two exceptions. The
first concerns the choice of law by the court of origin as to questions that were
excluded as main issues from the scope of the Convention but which may arise as
preliminary questions. They cover such matters as damage or injury resulting
from a nuclear incident, the determination of the existence or constitution of
legal persons or the powers of their officers or directors, the status or capacity of
natural persons, matters of family law, maintenance claims, succession, bank-
ruptcy or winding up, matters of social security, and matters concerning the
judicial supervision of incompetent persons." If the court of origin in order to
render its judgment had to decide any of these questions and if the result reached
does not agree with the result that the court addressed would have reached by
applying a different conflict rule than the one applied by the court of origin,
the court addressed is not required to recognize or enforce the judgment.77 It
is submitted that this exception should not have been included in the U.K.-
U.S.A. Convention. In the first place it is not representative of the American
and as we shall see the English approach and it is not supported by either Amer-
ican or English precedent. In the second place, it is difficult to visualize its use-
fulness in a Convention that does not apply to maintenance, alimony, proprietary
claims between spouses, and matters of succession. It is mainly in connection
with such matters that preliminary questions as to domestic status arise. In the
everyday commercial practice there are no problems as to the existence or
constitution of a corporation or its powers or the powers of its officers and direc-
tors. In transnational contracts of some importance these matters are investigated
before the contract is signed and in informal transactions the erosion of the ultra
vires doctrine and the wide application of apparent authority have dispensed of
complications. Furthermore, American and English conflict rules in the topics
covered by the Convention are very similar and are not likely to give rise to
diametrically opposed results.
The testing by the court addressed of the foreign court's choice of law has
74 The French courts have abandoned the "revision a fond" of a foreign judgment. This
consisted in a review of facts and law in order to determine the merits of the decision reached.
See Munzer v. Jacoby-Munzer, Cour de Cass. Ch. Civ. (1st Sect.) (1964), [1964] Bull. des
Arrets de la Cour de Cass. Ch. Civ. I, No. 15, at 11. They still, however, refuse to recognize
or enforce the foreign judgment if the result does not agree with the result that would have
been reached by a French court applying to the same situation the French conflict rule. See
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 32, at 57-58. Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign
Money Judgments; One Down and More to Go, 13 Am. J. CoMP. L. 72 (196+).
75 GERMAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 328(3). See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 32,
at 67, 72.
76 U.K.-U.S.A. Convention, Art. 2(2) (g) (h) and (3).
77 Id. at Art. 7(e).
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been ably supported by two commentators"8 on the ground that it tends to ensure
that the defendant has been treated fairly and that it denies recognition when the
foreign judgment is based on an arbitrary or parochial choice of law. It is sub-
mitted that justice can be better served by denying in extreme and exceptional
cases recognition or enforcement on grounds of public policy. Even though in
the Anglo-American conflict of laws public policy is rarely used, it is appropriate
in this context in order to emphasize that probing into choice of law merits should
be resorted to sparingly, if at all. The inclusion of choice of law testing in the
Hague Convention"9 reflects Continental European thought. Moreover, it may
have some justification because of the important differences between civil law and
common law countries on conflict rules applicable to domestic status, succession
and the status of corporations. A similar provision in the European Convention80
is again representative of the Continental European approach and may prove
necessary on matters of maintenance and alimony that are within the scope of
the European Convention.
The second exception to the rule that there will be no review of merits or
of choice of law, concerns the application of mandatory provisions of the law
of the court addressed. A judgment will not be recognized at the request of the
judgment-debtor, if the court of origin applied the law chosen by the parties to
govern a particular transaction, in disregard of mandatory provisions of the law
of the court addressed that would be applicable according to the conflict rule of
the court addressed. 8 If, for instance, a court in the United Kingdom disre-
garded the application of disclosure provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 or
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to a transaction substantially connected with
a state of the United States,82 on the ground that the relevant agreement provided
that English law should govern, the English judgment would not, at the request
of the respondent, be recognized or enforced in the United States. The author
knows of no authority either American or English that supports this proposition.
There is, however, some justification for its inclusion in the U.K.-U.S.A. Con-
vention, in order to deny effectiveness to a choice of law by the parties that would
lead to the evasion of a mandatory provision designed to protect the public
interest or the consumer.8 '
G. Effect of Recognition and Finality
The effect of recognition is that the foreign judgment is conclusive as to the
underlying cause of action (res judicata) and also as to the decided issues (col-
lateral estoppel) with regard to the original parties, their successors and privies,
and that it is to be recognized and enforced in the same manner as the judg-
ment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit.8 4
78 Von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1601, 1637-39 (1968).
79 See note 77, supra at Art. 7(2).
80 Id. at Art. 27(4).
81 U.K.-U.S.A. Convention, Art 8(d).
82 See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAW, supra note 17, at § 187.
83 See Zaphiriou, Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in International Com-
mercial Agreements, 3 INT'L TRADE L. JOURNAL (1977).
84 Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, § 3; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS




What effect will be given to a foreign judgment will be decided according
to the domestic law of the court addressed and includes not only a res judicata
effect but also, in a proper case, collateral estoppel effects. 5 Collateral estoppel
effects can be more easily attributed to a judgment of a common law country
8"
than to a judgment of a civil law country. Generally in civil law countries the
effect of a judgment as res judicata is restricted to the dispositive part of the
judgment as distinct from the premises."' It is submitted that the court ad-
dressed must first determine the effect of the judgment according to the law of
the court of origin and then apply its own law in order to attribute to the judg-
ment as equivalent an effect as is possible under its own law.
American"' and English 9 courts have refused to accept that the cause of
action merges into the foreign country judgment. As a result the plaintiff or a
person claiming under him may bring an action in the United States on the
original claim. This normally is of no practical use, unless, for instance, the
original claim is in a foreign hard currency and the foreign judgment has been
converted into another foreign currency that has in the meantime depreciated.
American courts do not recognize or enforce interlocutory judgments."
They may enforce at their discretion a foreign money judgment which is final
but subject to an appeal9 or stay the enforcement proceedings until the appeal
has been heard and determined.9" American courts tend increasingly to recog-
nize and enforce modifiable judgments (e.g. judgments for maintenance or
alimony) provided they are final and enforceable under the law of the court of
origin and will allow the party claiming the modifications to advance the same
arguments that he could have made before the court of origin.93
In case of a foreign judgment which is irreconcilable with a local judgment,
the foreign judgment need not be recognized. 4 In case of two or more foreign
85 Bata v. Bata, 39 Del. Ch. 258, 163 A.2d 493, 506 (1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964
(1961); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892, 898-99 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), modified on other grounds, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905
(1971); Smit, supra note 31, at 63; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 78. Contra Gut-
teridge, Reciprocity in Regard to Foreign Judgments, 13 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L LAW 49 (1932).
See compromise solution in Article 13 of U.K.-U.S.A. Convention.
86 Newton v. Hunt, 59 Misc. 633, 112 N.Y.S. 573 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
87 Miller, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in Continental and Anglo-
American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1-36, 238-66 (1940-41); von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 78, at 1674-77.
88 Peterson, supra note 26, at 224-29, 239. But see Neporany v. Kir, supra note 69, which
went so far as to suggest that because of merger of the cause of action in the foreign judgment
the original tort action was not subject to New York public policy.
89 CHESHIRE & NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 631-32 (9th ed. 1974); DicEy &
MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1023-24 (9th ed. 1973). In Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner and
Keeler Ltd. No. 2, [1967] 1 A.C. 853, 966, Lord Wilberforce criticized the non-merger effect
as an "illogical anachronism." This was not accepted, however, by three of the other Law
Lords. Id. at 917, 927 and 938.
90 See VON MEHREN & PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 47 and decisions cited therein.
91 Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, § 2.
92 Id. at § 6.
93 Worthley v. Worthley, 33 Cal. Rep. 2d 465, 474, 283 P.2d 19, 25 (1955); Herczog v.
Herczog, 186 Cal. App. 2d 318, 9 Cal. Rep. 5 (1960) ; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 78,
at 1657-58; VON MEHREN & PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 48. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS, supra note 17, at § 109, Comment d. See Uniform Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act, § 1(2), which excludes "a judgment for support in matrimonial family
matters."




judgments, by analogy to the rule applicable to sister state judgments, the later
judgment prevails,9" unless the later judgment has no res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect95 or did not decide the effect of the first.9" If the foreign judgment
was rendered after proceedings on the same subject matter were commenced by
the same parties in the United States, the foreign judgment is attributed no
effect in the United States. 8
H. Enforcement Procedures
The judgment of a federal court is enforced in another district by merely
registering a certified copy of the judgment in the federal court of the district in
which enforcement is sought.9 Only judgments for the recovery of money or
property can be so registered. The judgment must have become final by appeal-
or the time for appeal must have expired. The judgment will have the same
effect as a judgment of the district of registration. The enforcement of a foreign
country judgment by a federal court is subject to the rules that apply in the state
in which the federal court adjudicates.'
The tendency in most states of the United States is to extend methods of
enforcement of sister state judgments to foreign country judgments. A distinction
must be made between money judgments and judgments ordering other relief.
The procedure for enforcement of a foreign country money judgment varies
from state to state and cannot be summarized. In most states a new action is
required on the foreign judgment in the form of an action in debt and a new
local judgment is obtained which is subsequently enforced. 1 ' It depends on the
local procedure whether proceedings leading to a summary judgment can be
used.
A considerable number of states have adopted the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act either in its 1948 version.0 2 or in its revised 1964
version.' The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, according to
its terms, applies only to sister state judgments. It provides for the registration
of the judgment with the clerk of the court in which enforcement is sought.
Notice of the enforcement proceedings is served upon the judgment-debtor.
The only states that have adopted both the Uniform Enforcement of
95 Bata v. Bata, supra note 85; Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., 203 Misc. 470, 116
N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1952); VON MEHREN & PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 49. See
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 17, at § 114, as to sister state judgments;
Ginsburg, judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-In-Time Rule for Conflict-
ing Judgments, 82 HARv. L. REV. 798 (1969).
96 Bata v. Bate, supra note 85.
97 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss Jena, supra note 85.
98 Kohn v. American Metal Climax Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
modified, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); Bouas v. Sociedad
Maritima San Nicholas S.A., 252 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); U.K.-U.S.A. Convention,
Art. 7(c) (ii).
99 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1948).
100 Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
101 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAW, supra note 17, § 100, Comments b, d.
102 9A U.L. ANN. 475 (Master ed. 1976). Illinois among other states, has adopted the
1948 version. See SMITH-HuRD ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 77 §§ 88-105 (1966, Suppl. 1977).
103 New York and Oklahoma, among other states, have adopted the 1964 version. See
McKINNEY's N.Y. CIv. PRACT. §§ 5401-08 (1963, Supp. 1964-77); OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§
711-19 (1960, Supp. 1977-78).
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Foreign Judgments Act and the Uniform Recognition Act are Alaska, Illinois,
New York, Oklahoma and Washington. According to § 3 of the Uniform Recog-
nition Act, a foreign country judgment "is enforceable in the same manner as
the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit." Thus,
in Illinois, for example, the following steps are to be taken: (1) Authentication
of the foreign country judgment by having it translated into English, if necessary,
and legalized by the United States Consular Service in the country of origin; (2)
registration of the judgment with the Clerk of the court in which enforcement
is sought; (3) filing of petition setting out the particulars of the judgment, stat-
ing that it is final and conclusive in the country of origin and binding on the
person against whom enforcement is sought and praying for its enforcement;
(4) summons to be served upon the judgment-debtor with copy of the petition.
If the judgment-debtor fails to plead within the time specified in the summons
or in any event within thirty days or if the court after hearing has refused to set
the registration aside, the registered judgment shall become a final judgment of
the court in which it was registered. The respondent in the enforcement pro-
ceedings can plead a defense, set-off, or counterclaim as in any other civil
action.' 4
Unlike Illinois, New York has amended § 3 of the Uniform Recognition
Act to the effect that the foreign country judgment is enforceable by an action
on the judgment." 5 Summary proceedings leading to a summary judgment,
however, can be used.' An affidavit is filed in support of a motion for a sum-
mary judgment. No filing of a complaint is necessary. A summons with copy
of the motion and affidavit are served upon the judgment-debtor.
The position as to non-money judgments is uncertain. A foreign country
judgment ordering an injunction or specific performance will probably be enforced
in the United States by analogy to what applies to sister state judgments.' 7 In
the case of enforcement of a foreign non-money judgment, the rendering of a
local judgment ordering the relief will be indispensable. Article 15 of the U.K.-
U.S.A. Convention leaves it to the discretion of the court addressed to either re-
fuse enforcement or order the appropriate local relief.
III. Recognition and Enforcement in the United Kingdom
Basically the position is the same in the United Kingdom as it is in the
United States. A foreign final and conclusive judgment if rendered by a court of
origin which had jurisdiction according to the English conflict rule, after proper
notice to the defendant and an opportunity to defend, will be recognized and
enforced in the United Kingdom, unless it was obtained by fraud or it is contrary
to public policy.
The aim of this part of the article is to focus on the differences between the
104 See SMITH-HuRD, supra note 102 at §§ 90-95.
105 See McKINNEY'S, supra note 103, at § 5303.
106 Id. at § 3212(b); VON MEHREN & PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 51.
107 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS, supra note 17, at § 102. The Restatement
gives only one case in connection with the enforcement of a foreign country non-money judg-
ment: Robin v. Long, 60 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 200 (1880),in which the New York court ordered
the defendant to convey land in Canada in compliance with a Canadian decree.
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American and the English approach and to confirm an important similarity.
There are five differences: (1) There is more extensive enforcement by registra-
tion in the United Kingdom. This is due to statutory provisions and the ex-
istence of bilateral conventions on reciprocal enforcement of judgments with the
United Kingdom. Foreign judgments that do not come within the scope of the
statutory provisions have to be enforced by action on the judgment accord-
ing to common law rules. The judgment-creditor can apply for a summary
judgment under Order 14 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. (2) There is
some support in England for the doctrine of obligation as a basis for the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments. (3) American courts tend to extend
to the court of origin the same rules that they apply to their own transnational
jurisdiction whereas English statutes and courts differentiate between the juris-
diction of an English court and the jurisdiction of the court of origin in a similar
situation. (4) A foreign judgment can be impeached in England for both
extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. (5) A modifiable foreign judgment cannot be en-
forced in England.
The important similarity to be confirmed is that the law in the United
Kingdom as in the United States does not favor the review of merits of a foreign
judgment or of the foreign court's choice of law.
A. Statutory Registration
Under the Judgments Extension Act of 1868, money judgments rendered
by the High Court of Justice in England, the Court of Sessions in Scotland and
the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland can be enforced throughout the
United Kingdom by registration. Registration is effected as of right by register-
ing a certificate issued by the adjudicating court with either of the two other
superior courts. Objections against the judgment must be raised in the jurisdic-
tion in which it was rendered. The Act does not apply to probate, divorce, or
non-money judgments that are therefore subject to the common law rules on
enforcement.
The enforcement of money judgments obtained in a Commonwealth
country is governed by the Administration of Justice Act of 1920. Enforcement
is also effected by registration, but not as of right. Whether a Commonwealth
judgment will be allowed to be registered depends on whether the court of origin
had jurisdiction and on other available defenses which are similar to those pre-
vailing in the United States and at common law. The court of origin is con-
sidered to have had jurisdiction if the defendant voluntarily submitted to its
jurisdiction or was "ordinarily" resident or was carrying on business in the
country of origin. 118 A notable difference in the defenses available under this
Act and the common law defenses is that an appealable judgment may not be
registered." 9 The Act is extended to countries of the Commonwealth by Order
in Council and on a basis of reciprocity. Until 1933 it was extended to a number
of Commonwealth countries, but since 1933 arrangements are being made under
108 Administration of Justice Act of 1920, § 9(2).
109 Id. at § 9(2) (e).
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the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933 which is grad-
ually superseding the Administration of Justice Act of 1920.
The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933 applies
only to money judgments. It is extended to a particular country by Order in
Council on a basis of reciprocity ensured by a bilateral convention between the
United Kingdom and the country concerned. It has been extended to the
Australian Capital Territory, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, India, Isle of Man,
Israel, Italy, Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin, France, Guernsey,
Jersey, Norway, the Netherlands and Pakistan. The judgment of a superior
court of any of these countries is enforced by registration in the superior courts
of England, Scotland, or Northern Ireland. The registration must be set aside if
the registering court is satisfied that: (1) The judgment is not within the scope
of the Act; or (2) the court of origin had no jurisdiction; or (3) the judgment-
debtor being the defendant in the original proceedings did not receive notice of
the original proceedings in sufficient time to defend them and did not appear;
or (4) the judgment was obtained by fraud; or (5) the enforcement of the
judgment would be contrary to public policy; or (6) the rights under the judg-
ment as not vested in the person applying for registration.'" The registration
may be set aside if the registering court is satisfied that the judgment is irrecon-
cilable with a previous final and conclusive judgment of a court having jurisdic-
tion."' The Act further specifies those situations in which the court of origin is
considered to have properly exercised jurisdiction. The Act's rules as to jurisdic-
tion will be mentioned below in Section C which deals generally with jurisdiction.
As soon as the European Convention becomes effective in the United King-
dom, it will supersede the existing bilateral conventions with member states of
the European Community. Judgments of member states of the European Com-
munity that are at present within the scope of the Foreign Judgments (Re-
ciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933 will be dealt with under the terms of the
European Convention.
B. Basis of Recognition and Enforcement
While statutory enforcement is extended on a basis of reciprocity, the
common law requires no reciprocity as a prerequisite to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. Early English decisions based the recognition
of foreign judgments on comity and on a public international law obligation." 2
Later, a doctrine of obligation was developed" 3 which was formulated as follows
by Blackburn J.:
110 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933, § 4(1) (a).
111 Id. at § 4(1)(b).
112 Roach v. Garvan, [1748] 1 Ves. Sen. 157, 159; Geyer v. Aguilar, [1798] 7 Term. Rep.
681, 697; Wright v. Simpson, [1802] 6 Ves. 714, 730; Alvis v. Bunbury, [1814] 4 Camp. 28.
113 Russell v. Smyth, [1842] 9 M. & W. 810, 819; William v. Jones, [1845] 13 M. & W.
627, 633; Goddard v. Gray, [1870] L.R. 6 Q.B. 139, 149-50; CHESHIRE & NORTH, PRIvATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 630-31 (9th ed. 1974); DICEY & MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 987 (9th
ed. 1973); GRAVESON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 618-19 (7th ed. 1974); READ, REcoGNroN AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 121-22 (1938).
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We think that... the true principle on which the judgment of foreign tribu-
nals is enforced in England is .. . that the judgment of a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction over the defendant imposes a duty or obligation on the de-
fendant to pay the sum for which judgment is given, which the courts of
this country are bound to enforce; and consequently that anything which
negatives that duty or forms a legal excuse for not performing it, is a
defence to the action.
1 1 4
The doctrine of obligation can be criticized on several grounds. First, it is
predicated on the misconception that the defendant has an obligation and the
plaintiff has a vested right. Whether the defendant has an obligation and the
successful plaintiff has a vested right depends on the conflict rules of the court
addressed; it is therefore illogical to suggest that the basis of the conflict rules is
the obligation allegedly imposed on the defendant. Secondly, it disregards that
recognition or enforcement depends on conditions imposed by the law of the
court addressed and on defenses provided by that law. Thirdly, all judgments
do not impose an obligation; judgments on status or declaratory judgments
determine the existence of a certain relationship or of a state of things.
C. Jurisdiction
For a foreign judgment to be recognized and enforced in England, the
court of origin must have had jurisdiction according to the English conflict rule.
The emphasis in England, as in the United States, is on jurisdiction over the
person rather than over the subject matter. The same distinction is drawn
between actions in personam and actions in rem. It is generally accepted that a
judgment dealing with a proprietary interest in either immovable or movable
property, when rendered by a court of the country where the res was situated,
will be recognized or enforced in the United Kingdom, if all other conditions
for recognition and enforcement are satisfied. The cases cited in support of this
proposition are cases dealing with judgments in rem determining proprietary
interests in ship 15 or in a cargo."'0 In England as in the United States judgments
in rem have been used in a wider sense to include judgments as to domestic
status which are also universal in their effect when pronounced by a court of
proper jurisdiction.117 Jurisdiction and choice of law as to matters of domestic
status, such as the validity of the marriage, divorce, legitimacy, and legitimation,
are in English law, subject to few exceptions, dominated by the jurisdiction of the
country of domicile and the application of its law. Matters of domestic status,
of administration of estates, and of bankruptcy require special analysis which is
outside the scope of this article.
In connection with foreign judgments dealing mainly with claims in con-
tract and in tort, an English court will recognize jurisdiction in a foreign court
when exercised on the following bases:
(1) The defendant had, at the time when the action was brought, a place
114 Schibsby v. Westenholz, [1870] L.R. 6 Q.B. 155, 159.
115 Castrique v. Imrie, [1870] L.R. 4 H.L. 414.
116 Cammell v. Sewell, [1858] 3 H. & N. 617, aff'd other grounds, [1860] 5 H. & N. 728.
117 See, e.g., Salvesen v. Administrator of Austrian Property, [1927] A.C. 641.
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of residence in the country of origin. Some English decisions118 have supported
the jurisdiction of the court of origin when founded on temporary presence and
personal service of the defendant within the jurisdiction. English commentators,
however, are almost unanimously opposed to such a view.11 Furthermore, the
Administration of Justice Act of 1920 which extended enforcement by registra-
tion to certain Commonwealth judgments requires the defendant to be "ordi-
narily" resident in the country of origin and the Foreign Judgment (Reciprocal
Enforcement) Act of 1933 speaks of "residence." Article 10(1) of the Hague
Convention and Article 10(b) of the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention refer to the
"habitual residence" of the defendant and the European Convention appears to
support a similar concept. Abstract definitions by the use of adjectives are of
little use, it will be up to the courts to define in concrete situations what amounts
to residence in this context.
(2) The defendant had, at the time when the action was brought, a place
of business within the country of origin. The formulation of this basis of jurisdic-
tion varies at common law, the Administration of Justice Act of 1920 and the
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933. At common law
it is clear that doing business and the mere presence of a director of a corpora-
tion within the jurisdiction are not sufficient to found jurisdiction in the court of
origin.Y° Nor is the presence of an agent of the corporation sufficient, if the
agent had no power to enter into a contract on the corporation's behalf. 21
The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933 requires that a
corporation had, at the time when the action was brought, its "principal place of
business" in the country of origin. 122 The same Act requires that an individual
or corporate defendant had an office or place of business in the country of origin
and "the original action was brought in respect of a transaction effected
through or at that office or place."1 2 A more comprehensive formulation is to be
found in Article 10(1) and (2) of the Hague Convention which adds to the
above, the country (or state) of incorporation or the country where the "seat"
(i.e. the center of administration) of an association is situated. As we shall see,
when dealing with the European Convention, civil law countries have no system
of incorporation and provide that an association is domiciled at the place where
its "seat" is situated. The Hague Convention is closely followed by Article 10(b),
(c) and (e) of the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention. The U.K.-U.S.A. Convention
dealing with recognition and enforcement of judgments between two common
law countries makes no reference to the "seat" of an association. On the other
hand it makes an important addition and a useful clarification: The addition
concerns enterprises conducting business on a continuing basis within the ter-
ritory of origin which had appointed or had a duty to appoint an agent to receive
service of process there in respect of such business. Such enterprises include
118 Schibsby v. Westenholz, [1870] L.R. 6 Q.B. 155; Carrick v. Hancock, [18953 12 T.L.R.
59; Emanuel v. Symon, [1908] 1 K.B. 302.
119 CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 113, at 640-41; DicEY & MORRIS, supra note 113, at
1003-04; cf. GRAVESON, supra note 113, at 621.
120 Littauer Glove Corporation v. F. W. Millington Ltd., [1928] 44 T.L.R. 726.
121 Vogel v. R. & A. Kohnstamm Ltd., [1973] 1 Q.B. 133.
122 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933, § 4(2) (a) (iv).
123 Id. at 4(2) (a) (v).
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"overseas companies" carrying on business in England that have to be registered
with the Registrar of Companies. They also include foreign corporations which
in most states of the United States have to obtain a certificate of authority. Jur-
isdiction exercised on such enterprises by the court of origin in proceedings re-
lated to their local business is to be recognized by the court addressed. The
clarification concerns subsidiaries. Having merely a subsidiary within the ter-
ritory of origin is not sufficient to found jurisdiction against the parent enter-
prise.
(3) The defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of origin. This
includes the submission of present or future disputes. The former is usually
effected by voluntary appearance and the latter by means of choice of forum
clauses. It is not clear whether appearance under protest to dispute the foreign
court's jurisdiction amounts to submission. In Harris v. Taylor,' the Court of
Appeal held that the defendant who had protested to the jurisdiction of a Manx
court had submitted to jurisdiction. The defendant, a domiciled Englishman
resident in England, had committed a tort in the Isle of Man and had been
served by process outside the jurisdiction pursuant to a Manx rule equivalent
to Order 11 rule 1(1) (h) of the English Rules of the Supreme Court which
permits, at the discretion of the English court, service of process outside the
jurisdiction when a tort was committed in England.
The decision in Harris v. Taylor has since been explained by the Court of
Appeal in Re Dulles' Settlement (Na. 2)12 as resting on the grounds that juris-
diction exercised by a foreign court on a rule equivalent to an English rule will be
recognized in England and also that denying effect to the defendant's protest was
res judicata and therefore binding on the English court. The Foreign Judgments
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 193312 introduced an important improvement
as to judgments that come within its scope. It provides that appearance "for the
purpose of protecting or obtaining the release, of property seized, or threatened
with seizure . . . or of contesting the jurisdiction" does not amount to sub-
mission.
Despite these decisions, the position at common law is still unsettled. Some
decisions suggest an illogical distinction between appearance to have seized prop-
erty released (this not counting as submission) and appearance to protect
property threatened to be seized (which does amount to submission)."' An-
other proposition which requires clarification is whether submission as to future
disputes must be effected by express agreement or can also be effected by an
implied agreement. An ingenious, but nevertheless incorrect reasoning by Diplock,
J. in Blohn v. Desser s suggested that an English resident who was a partner in
a family partnership which carried on business in Vienna and who was registered
as a partner in the commercial register in Vienna had impliedly submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Austrian courts. This reasoning was not followed in Vogel v.
124 [1915] 2 K.B. 580.
125 [1951] Ch. 842.
126 § 4(2) (a) (i).
127 De Cosse Brissac v. Rathbone, [1861] 6 H. & N. 300; Voinet v. Barrett, [1885] 55
L.J.Q.B. 39, 41; Guiard v. De Clermont Donner, [1914] 3 K.B. 145.
128 [1962] 2 Q.B. 116.
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Kohnstamm,"' where it was held that submission must be express. Article 10 (5)
of the Hague Convention and Article 10(d) of the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention re-
quire that submission of disputes either present or future should be effected by
an agreement in writing or an oral agreement confirmed in writing, as does the
European Convention.
According to the majority of English commentators, an English court will
not recognize the following bases of jurisdiction in the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments: nationality30 or domicile'3 ' or temporary presence '2
of the defendant, or mere presence of an. asset of the defendant within the
jurisdiction unless the action was to assert a proprietary interest in an immovable
or movable. 33 The rejection of these jurisdictional bases agrees with the Hague
Convention and its Supplementary Protocol of October 15, 1966, with American
law and is dearly expressed in the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention.'34
While English law commendably follows general trends in accepting certain
jurisdictional bases and in rejecting others, it suffers from a serious shortcoming
by denying to foreign courts jurisdictional bases frequently used by English courts
in similar transnational situations. Order 11 rule 1 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court permits in certain cases, by leave of the court to be given at its discretion,
the service of process outside the jurisdiction. Such cases include, among others,
contractual claims on a contract which was made in England or on a contract
that is governed either expressly or impliedly by English law, or for a breach of
contract that occurred in England. Without going into much detail, such
exercise of jurisdiction is, if anything, wider than the jurisdiction which is
exercised by American courts under the long-arm statutes of some states. Another
basis used for the exercise of jurisdiction by an English court which is equivalent
to long-arm provisions in American state statutes is in an action in tort for a
tort which was committed in England. In spite of these wide provisions which
can be used to confer jurisdiction to an English court, it has been repeatedly held
that an equivalent basis when used by a foreign court will not be recognized when
it comes to the recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment in England. 5
129 See note 121 supra.
130 The nationality of the defendant as a basis of jurisdiction found some support in early
decisions, but is now under general criticism and should be considered as practically abandoned.
See CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 113, at 640-41; DIcEY & MORRIS, supra note 113, at
1003-04; GRAVESON, supra note 113, at 621-22.
131 See CHESHIRE & NORTH; DIcEY & MORRIS, note 130.
132 See notes 118, 199 supra.
133 Thus American judgments rendered by the exercise of a jurisdiction quasi in rem and
German judgments rendered by the exercise of jurisdiction according to Article 23 of the
German Code of Civil Procedure will not be recognized in England. See Emanuel v. Symon,
[1908] 1 K.B. 302; Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Raiah of Faridkote, [1894] A.C. 670, 685;
CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 115, at 641-42. Contra Becquet v. Macarthy, [1831] 2 B. &
Ad. 951; GRAVESON, supra note 113, at 624-25, who states that American judgments quasi in
rem should be recognized and enforced. It should be noted that recovery under an American
judgment quasi in rem is limited to the value of the asset which is usually attached under
garnishment proceedings and service of process is effected on the garnishee as representative
of the absent defendant. On the other hand German judgments under Article 23 of the
German Code of Civil Procedure are not limited to the value of the asset.
134 See notes 2, 3 supra.
135 It was decided in Emanuel v. Symon, supra note 133, at 309, that:
In actions in personam there are five cases in which the courts of this country will
enforce a foreign judgment: (1) Where the defendant is a subject of the foreign
country in which the judgment has been obtained; (2) where he was resident in the
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There are two notable indications that this approach by the English courts
will be reversed. The first concerns the recognition in England of foreign divorce
decrees rendered by a court of a country in which the husband is not domiciled
on an exceptional jurisdictional ground which is also provided by an English
statute. This occurred in Travers v. Holley. 6 in which the Court of Appeal
recognized a divorce decree of a court of New South Wales in Australia against a
husband who was domiciled in England. The court in Australia had exercised
jurisdiction on a ground similar to an existing statutory ground in England.
Hodson L.J. made the following observation:
I would say that where, as here, there is in substance reciprocity, it would
be contrary to principle and inconsistent with comity if the courts of this
country were to refuse to recognise a jurisdiction which mutatis mutandis
they claim for themselves." 7
In a later case Hodson L.J. attempted to limit the import of his observation by
confining it to matrimonial cases."'
The second indication, although merely dictum, is important because the
dictum referred to a case in which the court of origin had exercised jurisdiction
over a foreign non-resident defendant on the ground that a tort had been com-
mitted within the jurisdiction. Denning L.J. in Re Dulles Settlement (No. 2)1
39
referred to Harris v. Taylor,4 ' whose facts were given above, and said:
I do not doubt that our courts would recognize a judgment properly ob-
tained in the Manx courts for a tort committed there, whether the defen-
dant voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction or not; just as we would ex-
pect the Manx courts in a converse case to recognize a judgment obtained
in our courts against a resident in the Isle of Man, on his being properly
served out of our jurisdiction for a tort committed here.
The above observations of Lord Hodson and Lord Denning M.R. are
particularly pertinent in the case of American judgments as the American courts
have gone a long way in recognizing judgments rendered by English courts ex-
ercising jurisdiction equivalent to the long arm jurisdiction of some American
courts.' 4' Reciprocity of treatment in this particular context will be ensured by
the ratification of the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention. The Convention contains three
compromise provisions, two relate to actions in contract and the third to actions
in tort. The court of origin has jurisdiction in the case of a contract for the
supply of goods or services when the invitation to treat was advertised in or
otherwise directed to the country of origin and the contemplated performance
foreign country when the action began; (3) where the defendant in the character
of plaintiff has selected the forum in which he is afterwards sued; (4) where he has
voluntarily appeared; and (5) where he has contracted to submit himself to the
forum in which the judgment was obtained; Phillips v. Batho, [1913] 3 K.B. 25,
29; Societe Cooperative Sidmetal v. Titan International Ltd., [1966] 1 Q.B. 828, 841.
136 [1953] P. 246.
137 Id. at 257.
138 In re Trepca Mines Ltd., [1960] 1 W.L.R. 1273, 1281-82.
139 [1951] 1 Ch. 842, 851.
140 See note 124 supra.
141 See notes 43, 44, 45 supra.
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was substantially to occur in the country of origin.' It also has jurisdiction
when both parties to the contract resided or had places of business in the country
of origin and the obligation in issue was mainly to be performed there. 43 The
third provision which deals with the jurisdiction of the court of origin in actions
in tort was discussed above.'
C. Fraud
A foreign judgment will not be recognized or enforced in England if it was
obtained by fraud.'4 5 This can either be fraud by the court,'4" which is rare, or
on the court. 47 While English judgments cannot be set aside for fraud on the
strength of evidence that was available to the original court, the English con-
flict rule denies recognition or enforcement to a foreign judgment which was
obtained by fraud even though no new evidence is produced. 4 In other words,
when it comes to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments English
courts unlike the American courts'49 do not distinguish between intrinsic and
extrinsic fraud. The English approach has been criticized particularly on the
ground that a defendant can withhold a defense of fraud available in foreign




English courts like American courts will not recognize and enforce foreign
provisional or interlocutory judgments or judgments or orders of a similar
nature. 5 ' On the other hand foreign final judgments that are appealable, even
if the appeal is pending, will be recognized and enforced, 2 unless the English
court at its discretion stays execution 53 or the pending foreign appeal has the
effect to suspend the execution of the foreign judgment.'54
A distinguishing feature of note between the trend in the United States and
that in England is that foreign judgments that are subject to modification (e.g.
142 U.K.-U.S.A. Convention, Art. 10(f).
143 Id. at Art. 10(g).
144 See note 48, Part II Section B of text supra.
145 Administration of Justice Act of 1920, § 9(2) ; Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforce-
ment) Act of 1933, § 4(1) (a) (iv).
146 Price v. Dewhurst, [1837] 8 Sim. 279.
147 Ochsenbein v. Papelier, [1873] L.R. 8 Ch. App. 695, in which the trick was on the
court and on the defendant and was only discovered later.
148 See CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra, note 113 at 657-61; DicEY & MORRIS, supra note 113,
at 1028-29; Abouloff v. Oppenheimer, [1882] 10 Q.B.D. 295; Vadala v. Lawes, [1890] 25
Q.B.D. 310; Syal v. Heyward, [1948] 2 K.B. 443, for detailed criticism.
149 See part II Section D of text supra.
150 CHESHIRE & NORTH, supra note 113, at 661; READ, supra note 113, at 279-93; WOLF,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 247 (2d ed. 1950).,
151 Nouvion v. Freeman, [1889] 15 A.C. 1; In re Ridell, [1888] 20 Q.B.D. 512, 516; Blohn
v. Desser, [1962] 2 Q.B. 116.
152 Scott v. Pilkington, [1862] 2 B. & S. 11.
153 Id.; Nouvion v. Freeman, supra note 151, at 13.
154 Patrick v. Shedden, [1853] 2 E. & B. 14; cf. Berliner Industrie Bank A.G. v. Jost, [1971]
2 Q.B. 463, 470-71.
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for maintenance or alimony) are not enforceable in England except as to arrears
which cannot be modified.' "5
E. No Review of Merits or of Choice of Law
The English courts, like the American courts, do not review the merits of a
foreign judgment and are not concerned with errors of the court of origin on
questions of fact or law. This was carried to an extreme when it was decided that
even a glaring mistake as to English law could not be raised as a defense to en-
forcement."5 6
English courts are also not concerned with the correctness of the conflict
rule applied by the court of origin and the result reached. They only become
concerned if the result reached is contrary to English concepts of Justice, which
is merely an application of "natural justice" or public policy, and they may on
this ground refuse to recognize a foreign judgment or decree. 5 Such exceptional
exclusion on grounds of public policy is not tantamount to even a limited review.
In the light of the English approach we must again 58 express our objection to
Article 7 (e) of the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention which introduces a choice of law
test on preliminary questions concerning, inter alia, personal status and the status
of corporations.
IV. Recognition and Enforcement under the European Convention
It is a fundamental characteristic of the European Convention that in ad-
dition to conditions for the recognition and enforcement of judgments it contains
direct rules as to jurisdiction." 9 These rules provide when a court in a member
state of the European Community which has ratified the Convention (to be re-
ferred to as a "Contracting State") can exercise jurisdiction over a person or
over a subject matter in a transnational situation.'
In contrast, the Hague Convention, the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention and the
more modern bilateral conventions on reciprocal recognition and enforcement of
judgments' 6 ' contain indirect rules as to jurisdiction. They merely provide on
what jurisdictional bases a judgment will be recognized and enforced. Even
after the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention becomes effective, American and English
courts will not be obliged to exercise jurisdiction over the other nation's citizens,
corporations, and domiciliaries in accordance with the jurisdictional bases con-
155 Harrop v. Harrop, [1920] 3 K.B. 386; Beatty v. Beatty, [1924] 1 K.B. 807.
156 Godard v. Gray, [1870] L.R. 6 Q.B. 139, in which a French court came to a blatantly
wrong decision as to the effect of a penalty clause in a charterparty which was governed by
English law and the French judgment was enforced by action in England.
157 Gray v. Formosa, [1963] P. 259; Lepre v. Lepre, [1965] P. 52.
158 See Part II Section F of text supra.
159 Pointon, The EEC Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Com-
mercial Judgments and Its Implications for English Law in LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION (1975); M. WESER, CONVENTION COMMUNAUTAIRE SUR LA COMPETENCE
JUDICIAIRE ET L' EXECUTION DES DEcISIONs 51-76 (1975); Zaphiriou, The EEC Convention
on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW 74, 75 (1969).
160 It is stated in the Preamble of the European Convention that the Convention deter-
mines the "international jurisdiction" of the courts of the Contracting States.
161 See WESER, supra note 159, at 52.
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tained in the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention. They will apply their own rules as to
jurisdiction. Thus a federal court sitting in Illinois or a Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, may exercise jurisdiction over an English corporation which
transacted only one transaction in Illinois, in compliance with § 17(1) (a) of
the Civil Practice Act of Illinois and the minimum contact requirement of the
United States Constitution. The only consequence of such exercise of jurisdic-
tion would be that the judgment to be recovered against the English corporation
would not be recognized or enforced in England. Similarly an American or an
English court could exercise jurisdiction over a transient defendant served within
the jurisdiction, but the judgment against such a defendant would not be
recognized or enforced under the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention.'6 2 The consequences
would be quite different if a court of a Contracting State were to exercise juris-
diction by not complying with the direct jurisdictional rules of the European
Convention. First, the defendant would have local means of recourse open to
him and secondly, if the defendant were domiciled in another Contracting State,
that other Contracting State could complain to the appropriate Community
institution and in certain cases ask for measures to be taken. In addition, the
judgment would not be recognized and enforced in any of the Contracting
States.
The aim of the European Convention is to achieve a measure of uniformity
throughout the European Community as to jurisdictional rules and as to the
recognition and enforcement of judgments of the Contracting States. In order
to achieve this measure of uniformity, the six original member states signed a
Protocol in Luxembourg on June 3, 1971, in which they agreed to submit matters
concerning the interpretation of the European Convention to the European
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.6 The Protocol has been ratified by
the six and will be acceded to by the new member states. Courts of first instance
of the Contracting States are not empowered to request a preliminary ruling.
The power is vested in the courts of appeal and the supreme courts of the Con-
tracting States which can do so at their discretion, if they consider that a pre-
liminary ruling is necessary. The European Court of Justice only interprets the
particular provision or principle and leaves its concrete application to the facts
of the case to the adjudicating court of the member state.' 64
A. The Direct Jurisdictional Rules
1. General Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction is exercised by the courts of the Contracting State in
162 Even though the judgment will not be recognized or enforced under the U.K.-U.S.A.
Convention it may be recognized and enforced in accordance with a statute or the common law.
Article 3 of the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention provides expressly that the Convention does not
prevent recognition or enforcement in accordance with the law otherwise applicable. See as
to the recognition in the United States of the courts of original jurisdiction over a transient
defendant, the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act §§ 4(6), 5(1) supra. As
to the position in England, see the decisions in note 118 supra.
163 WESER, supra note 159, at 400-03.
164 ZAPHIRIOU, EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW 29 (1970).
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which the defendant is "domiciled." '165 This applies both to individuals and to
associations. "Association" is used here as a generic term comprising corpora-
tions, companies, partnerships, foundations, and other associations of natural or
legal persons with or without legal personality.
As to the definition of "domicile" there are differences between the present
Contracting States (the original six member states) even though they are all
civil law countries. 6' It is submitted that the differences are only slight and can
in any event be synthesized into a comprehensive concept. Domicile contains the
element of physical presence (corpus) coupled with an intention (animus) to
stay for some duration. It clearly excludes the two extremes, namely, mere
presence in which there is corpus and no animus and the domicile of origin as
understood in England and in Scotland 16 7 in which there may be animus and no
corpus. The best functional term that comes to mind is "habitual residence,"
but it is difficult to suggest this term in view of Article 59 of the European Con-
vention which, as we shall see, refers to defendants "domiciled or habitually
resident" in a third state.
Article 52 of the European Convention provides that whether a party is
domiciled in the Contracting State in which the adjudicating court sits will be
determined by the court's "internal law." If the adjudicating court, by applying
local statute or precedent, comes to the conclusion that the defendant is domiciled
in its jurisdiction, it need go no further. But if the court comes to the conclusion
that the party is domiciled in another Contracting State it must look into the
"law" of that State and also, it is submitted, into existing guidelines and
precedents of European community law. If this investigation reveals that the
party is domiciled in the Contracting State in which the court adjudicates, the
court should assume jurisdiction. If there is any doubt which the court cannot
resolve, a preliminary ruling can be obtained on appeal from the European Court
of Justice.
Article 53 of the European Convention provides that an association is
domiciled in the country where it has its seat and that this matter will be de-
termined by the conflict rules of the adjudicating court. According to the con-
flict rules of the civil law member states, the seat of an association is in the
country (or state) in which it has its center of administration. The seat is stated
in the articles of association and is known as the contractual seat (siege
statutaire). The contractual seat is at the place where the association is reg-
istered and coincides with the place of incorporation as understood in England
or the United States. An association, however, may have its center of admin-
istration in a country (or state) other than the country (or state) in which it is
incorporated or registered or organized. In that case it acquires according to the
civil law countries a real seat (siege rial) in this other country (or state).6' The
situation is, in substance, the same under American or English law: a corporation
may be incorporated in one country (or state) and have its headquarters or
principal place of business in another country (or state). For jurisdictional
165 European Convention, Art. 2.
166 GRAVESON, supra note 113, at 101.
167 See generally GRAVESON, supra note 113, at 195-207.
168 ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 164, at 124-28.
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purposes it is clear that a corporation can be sued either in the country (or state)
in which it is incorporated or in the country (or state) in which it has its head-
quarters or principal place of business. A partnership can be sued in the country
(or state) in which it is organized or registered and in which it carries on its
business.'69
2. Special Jurisdiction
According to Article 5 of the European Convention a person domiciled in
one Contracting State may be sued in another Contracting State as to the follow-
ing subject matters:
(1) as to contractual matters, in the courts for the place of performance of the
obligation at issue;""
(2) as to maintenance, in the courts for the place of domicile or habitual
residence of the person that claims maintenance;
(3) as to a tort, delict or quasi-delict in the courts for the place where "the
harmful event occurred" ;171
(4) as to civil claims for damages or restitution arising out of a criminal offense,
by filing the claim with the court which has jurisdiction over both the criminal
offense and the related claim;
(5) as regards disputes arising out of operations of a branch, agency, or other
establishment in the courts for the place where the branch, agency or establish-
ment is situated. The European Court of Justice decided in a preliminary
ruling 72 that an exclusive dealership did not constitute either a branch or an
agency and that "establishment" should be construed ejusdem generis (i.e. as
being in the same category) with the terms "branch" and "agency" which
precede it.
3. Jurisdiction as to Co-defendant or Third Party Proceedings
According to Article 6 of the European Convention a defendant who is
domiciled in a Contracting State may also be sued in the court of another Con-
tracting State in which action was brought against his co-defendant or where he
is properly joined under third party proceedings.
4. Jurisdiction in Matters Relating to Insurance, Installment Sales and Loans
169 Hellfeld v. Rechnitzer, [1914] 1 Ch. 748 (G.A.); Blohn v. Desser, [1962] 2 Q.B. 116.
170 In Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dfsnlop A.G., [1977] 1 Comm. MKT. L.R. 26,
the European Court of Justice held in a preliminary ruling that the place of performance has
to be determined according to the law that governs the contract and that the law governing
the contract must be determined by the conflict rule of the court of the Contracting State
which is seized of the matter. In Ets. A. De Bloos Sprl v. Ets. Boyer S.A., id., it was held that
the court of the Contracting State must look, for the determination of the place of performance,
at the particular obligation in issue and not at the contract as a whole.
171 In Handelswekerij G. J. Bier B. V. and Stichting Reinwater v. Mines de Potasse d'
Alsace S.A., [1977] CoMm. MxT. L.R. 284, the European Court of Justice held in a preliminary
ruling that the place where "the harmful effect occurred" can be either the place where the
tortious conduct took place or where the effect occurred and that the plaintiff has the option,
when conduct and effect occurred in different countries, to bring an action in either.
172 Ets. A. De Bloos Sprl v. Ets. Boyer S.A., [1977] 1 COMM. MKT. L.R. 60.
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The European Convention, in Articles 7-15, has special rules on jurisdiction,
including choice of forum clauses in matters of insurance, installment sales, and
loans made to finance the sale of goods and repayable by installments. The rules
are designed to protect the weaker party i.e. the insured the purchaser, and the
borrower under what are usually contracts of adhesion."'
5. Exclusive Jurisdiction
Article 16 of the European Convention determines which courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction, regardless of the domicile of the defendant. Article 16 ap-
plies to all individuals whether they are domiciled in a Contracting State or not,
and to all associations whether they have a seat in a Contracting State or not. 7
According to Article 16 (1), the courts of the Contracting State in which
immovable property is situated have exclusive jurisdiction "in matters relating
to rights in rem in, or tenancies of, immovable property." English law does not
stress the exclusive jurisdiction of certain courts as much as the civil procedures
of civil law countries which are reflected in Article 16. It accepts, however, the
exclusive in rem jurisdiction of the courts of the country in which immovable
property is situated. Thus, when the European Convention will become effective
in the United Kingdom, the jurisdiction of the English courts as to foreign im-
movable property will not be affected. But English courts will continue to
exercise jurisdiction over immovable property situated in the other Contracting
States in the exceptional cases of the administration of an English trust or of the
estate of a person that died domiciled in England that comprises such immovable
property."7 5 Also, in cases of bankruptcy of persons domiciled in England when
the assets include immovable property situated abroad. 6 The European Con-
vention does not apply to the administration of estates and to bankruptcy. It is
clear from the wording of Article 16(1) that the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of the situation is limited to rights in rem and, therefore, the English courts
will be able to exercise in personam jurisdiction as to matters relating to im-
movable property even if this is situated in a Contracting State. In any event, a
judgment in personam rendered by an English court in the exercise of its equit-
able jurisdiction requires no recognition or enforcement abroad, it can be en-
forced against the defendant when within the jurisdiction.'77 The defendant can
be compelled to comply with the requirements of the country in which the im-
movable property is situated.
Other courts which have exclusive jurisdiction, according to Article 16, are:
(1) the courts of the Contracting State in which an association has its seat as to
its constitution, nullity, dissolution and the powers of its officers and directors;
(2) the courts of the Contracting State in which a public register is kept as to the
validity of entries in the registry; (3) the courts of the Contracting State in which
173 See Zaphiriou, supra note 159, at 77-78.
174 European Convention, Art. 4(1).
175 Nelson v. Bridport, [1846] 8 Beav. 547; In re Stirling, [1908] 2 Ch. 344; In re Hoyles,
[1911] 1 Ch. 179; In re Ross, [1930] 1 Ch. 377; In re Duke of Wellington, [1947] Ch. 506.
176 Bankruptcy Act of 1914, §§ 53, 167.
177 Penn v. Lord Baltimore, [1750] 1 Ves. Sen. 444; British South Africa Co. v. De Beers
Consolidated Mines, [1910] 1 W.L.R. 392.
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the deposit or registration of a patent, mark, design or other similar right has been
applied for or has taken place or deemed to have taken place under an interna-
tional convention, as to matters relating to the registration or validity of these
rights; (4) the courts of the Contracting State in which a judgment is sought to
be enforced as to matters pertaining to enforcement.
As in the case of immovable property, the jurisdiction of the English courts
will not be much affected by these exclusive jurisdictions, when the European
Convention will become effective in the United Kingdom. Subjecting matters of
dissolution of an association to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Contracting State
in which the association has its seat could have affected the jurisdiction of
English courts as to the winding up of companies that are domiciled in a Con-
tracting State."' Winding-up, however, has been expressly excluded from the
scope of the European Convention.'79
6. Jurisdiction by Consent
Parties of whom one or more are domiciled in a Contracting State, may
submit by an agreement in writing or by an oral agreement confirmed in writing,
present or future disputes arising in connection with a particular legal relation-
ship, to the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or courts of a Contracting State.'
The agreement must be in writing or confirmed in writing. Unilateral written
confirmation by a seller in general conditions of sale containing a choice of forum
clause will not suffice.'
The submission will be ineffective if it purports to exclude the jurisdiction
of the courts of a Contracting State which have exclusive jurisdiction according
to Article 16 of the European Convention (see previous Section of this article).
It will also be ineffective if it is contrary to Articles 12 or 15 of the European
Convention which provide that choice of forum clauses in insurance policies or
in agreements for installment sales or in loan agreements for financing such sales
must comply with one or more of the following requirements: (1) they must be
for present and not future disputes, or (2) they must leave the choice of forum
to the option of the assured or beneficiary under the insurance policy, the buyer
under the installment sale and the borrower under the financing agreement, or
(3) they must submit disputes to the courts of the Contracting State in which
both parties to the policy or agreement are domiciled provided such submission
is not contrary to the law of that State.
Article 2 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure provides that a choice of
forum clause is only effective if both parties are aliens or one party is an alien
and the other an Italian not domiciled in Italy. According to the European
Convention,8 2 this provision does not apply to persons domiciled in a Con-
tracting State. It may, however, be applied to persons not domiciled in a Con-
178 Companies Act of 1948, § 399; Banque des Marchands de Moscou v. Kindersley, [1951]
ch. 112; In re Compania Merabello San Nicholas S.A., [1973] ch. 75, 88.
179 European Convention, Art. 1.
180 Id. at Art. 17.
181 Galeries Segoura Sprl v. Firma Rahim Bonakdarian, [1977] Co~fM. MKT. L.R. 36;
Colzani v. Ruwa Postereimaschinen GmbH, [1977] CoMM. MKT. L.R. 345.
182 European Convention, Art. 3 (2).
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tracting State. Thus an American corporation which agrees in writing with an
Italian interprise to submit disputes to the jurisdiction of an American court can
be sued in an Italian court having jurisdiction otherwise, even if this jurisdiction
is not exclusive. Courts of other member states generally comply with choice of
forum clauses in transnational commercial agreements."' 3
7. Jurisdiction by Appearance
A court of a Contracting State acquires jurisdiction by the defendant's ap-
pearance, unless the appearance was solely entered to contest jurisdiction or there
is another court having exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16 of the
European Convention.'"
8. Consideration of Jurisdiction by Adjudicating Court
A court of a Contracting State when seized of a matter will have to con-
sider of its own motion whether another court of a Contracting State has ex-
clusive jurisdiction."' In case of default of appearance of a defendant who is
domiciled in a Contracting State, the court must be satisfied that the defendant
was duly served and also that the European Convention's rules as to jurisdiction
have been complied with." 6 If the court comes to the conclusion that it has no
jurisdiction it shall decline to exercise it. If the defendant has not been duly
served or had no sufficient time to arrange for his defense, the court shall stay the
proceedings as long as is necessary.
9. Excessive Jurisdiction
Article 3(1) of the European Convention provides that an individual or
an association domiciled in a Contracting State can only be sued according to
the jurisdictional rules of the Convention. Article 3 (2) lists the provisions of the
law of some Contracting States which have as a result become inapplicable. The
following jurisdictional bases cannot be used against persons domiciled in a
Contracting State:
(1) Jurisdiction founded on the nationality of the plaintiff (Article 14 of the
French Civil Code, Article 14 of the Luxembourg Civil Code, Article 127 of the
Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure);
(2) jurisdiction founded on the domicile or residence of the plaintiff (Article
638 of the Belgian "Code Judiciaire" of 1967,"7 Article 126(3) of the Nether-
lands Code of Civil Procedure);
(3) presence or seizure within the jurisdiction of an asset belonging to the
defendant (Article 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure; Article 4(2) of
the Italian Code of Civil Procedure; Scottish law,' to be added upon the
183 G. DELAUMfE, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS § 8.11 (1977); Zaphiriou, supra note 83.
184 European Convention, Art. 18.
185 Id. at Art. 19.
186 Id. at Art. 20.
187 WESER, supra note 159, at 106 n.22.
188 See note 37 supra.
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accession of the United Kingdom to the European Convention);
(4) nationality of the defendant (Article 15 of the French Civil Code, Article 15
of the Luxembourg Civil Code);
(5) mere presence of the defendant and service of process on the defendant
within the jurisdiction (to be added upon the accession of Ireland and the United
Kingdom to the European Convention);
(6) exercise of jurisdiction in violation of a choice of forum clause on the ground
that the parties to the agreement are nationals or one is a national domiciled in
the Contracting State in which the court exercised jurisdiction (Article 2 of the
Italian Code of Civil Procedure);
(7) elected domicile or residence or unilateral submission (Article 4(1) of the
Italian Code of Civil Procedure).
All the above jurisdictions, which are known as "excessive' or "exorbitant"
jurisdictions, can be used against individuals and corporations that are not
domiciled in a Contracting State. This is expressly provided in Article 4(1) of
the European Convention. In fact according to Article 4(2) any person
domiciled in a Contracting State can avail himself of these excessive jurisdictions.
Thus not only a Frenchman but also an American who is domiciled in France
can bring an action against a person domiciled in Brazil pursuant to Article 14
of the French Civil Code. What appears as an extension of excessive jurisdictions
was brought about by the European Community's clumsy attempt not to inter-
fere with the right of member states to deal as they wish with persons not
domiciled in the European Community and also to abolish any discrimination
which is based on nationality. Instead the European Community should have
insisted that the member states should repeal the offensive provisions as being
contrary to generally accepted standards." 9
The harm stemming from this state of affairs is somewhat mitigated by
Article 59 of the European Convention. This enables a Contracting State to
assume the obligation towards a third state, by a convention on recognition and
enforcement of judgments, not to recognize or enforce judgments rendered in
another Contracting State against defendants domiciled or habitually resident in
the third state, when the court of origin exercised an excessive jurisdiction. It is
by virtue of this provision that the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention contains in Article
18(1) the undertaking by the United Kingdom not to recognize or enforce, at
the request of the judgment-debtor, a judgment that was rendered by a court
contrary to a treaty provision (e.g. contrary to a provision of the European Con-
vention) against a person (either an individual or an association) who is a
national of the United States or who has a domicile, a place of residence, or a
place of business, or is incorporated or has its registered office in the United
States. The same obligation was also undertaken by the United States, but is at
present of no importance as the United States is not a party to a convention on
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Article 18(2) contains the mutual
undertaking by the United Kingdom and the United States to apply in recogni-
189 Carl, The Common Market Judgments Convention-Its Threat and Challenge to
Americans, 8 INT'L LAWYER 446 (1974); Nadelmann, The Common Market Judgments Con-




tion or enforcement proceedings against each other's citizens, domiciliaries, and
residents the same standards as to jurisdiction and notice requirements that are
applied to their own. In compliance with this undertaking, an American court
could conceivably deny recognition to a community judgment against an English
domiciliary or resident because the judgment was rendered by a court of origin
exercising jurisdiction that does not satisfy the minimum contact requirement of
the United States Constitution.
B. Other Prerequisites for Recognition and Enforcement
The court addressed must first be satisfied that the court of origin had
jurisdiction. In case of a community judgment if the court of origin exercised
jurisdiction according to the direct rules of the European Convention the court
addressed is bound to uphold its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court addressed
will be bound by the findings of fact on jurisdiction of a community court of
origin. The court addressed is not entitled to review the jurisdictional findings
of the community court of origin and cannot apply the public policy reservation
to the jurisdictional findings.1"'
Once the court addressed is satisfied that on the face of it the judgment
complied with the direct jurisdictional rules, it will be recognized and enforced,
unless recognition is contrary to public policy or the defendant was not duly
served and did not appear, or the judgment is irreconcilable with a local judg-
ment. 9 '
The judgment is not to be reviewed as to its merits." 2 As was mentioned
above,'93 however, the court addressed is entitled to refuse recognition if the court
of origin resolved a preliminary question relating to personal status or capacity,
or to proprietary rights between spouses, or to wills or succession, by applying a
conflict rule which differs from the conflict rule of the court addressed and
reached a result that differs from the result that the court addressed would have
reached if it were called upon to determine the matter in the first instance."
V. Conclusion
At present, judgments rendered in the United States through an exercise of
jurisdiction based on long-arm statutes will probably not be recognized in the
United Kingdom. There are some slight indications, however, that this attitude
is changing. In contrast, judgments rendered in the United Kingdom by the
exercise of jurisdiction based on long-arm provisions that are equivalent to
American provisions, have been recognized and enforced in the United States.
If the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention is ratified, it will enable the recognition and
enforcement in either country of judgments that satisfy jurisdictional require-
ments representing a compromise between American and English long-arm
provisions.
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A further important result of the U.K.-U.S.A. Convention will be the pro-
tection of United States citizens, domiciliaries, and residents, whether individuals
or corporations, from the excessive jurisdiction of some courts in the European
Community. Such excessive jurisdictions include jurisdiction based on the na-
tionality or domicile of the plaintiff or the mere presence of an asset of the de-
fendant within the territorial jurisdiction of the adjudicating court or the exercise
of jurisdiction in violation of a choice of forum clause on the ground that a
party to the agreement is a national domiciled in the member state in which the
court exercised jurisdiction. A judgment recovered against a United States
national, domiciliary, or resident by the exercise of an excessive jurisdiction will
not be recognized and enforced in the United Kingdom. The U.K.-U.S.A. Con-
vention may be followed by other similar conventions between the United States
and the other individual member states, thereby extending the protection
throughout the European Community.
The Hague Draft Convention, the European Convention, and the bilateral
conventions on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of civil judgments in
Europe and in the British Commonwealth, as well as the anticipated conventions
on recognition and enforcement bf judgments with the United States, represent
a wide consensus on standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments and indirectly on the proper exercise of civil jurisdiction in transna-
tional cases. Although the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
remain in a state of flux, the -conventions discussed above signal the emergence
of certain general standards as to civil jurisdiction and the basic prerequisites for
recognition and enforcement of money judgments. We are now at the threshold
of new and exciting developments.
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